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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY,
1'laintilt,'Appellee,

:
':" •

•

:•

v.

:

CRAIG NORMAN HENDRICKS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No, 20001006-1A
Priorit\ K- ?

JUM iSDICliOl I'lLSlATEMENT
-,-:,/
•Ki"

TITH

on (his Court pursuant to Utah Code Aim. § 78-2a-3(2}' )

* prellaiii/Dciciidant Craig Hendricks was convicted of Domestic Violence

iiuiici}, a class M misdemeanor, in violation of SalfT ;^ • iu * wGv .

/

STATEMENT CM-" ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
t\

W'liether the trial court erred in submitting a defense of liabitatiori instruction to the
jury which was not supported by the evidence.
Standard of Review: "Determining the piopneh ml *i inn) msliuui m presents a

n

"^

8
1997).

i vuil noiiMleleiviilialh for correctness. State v. Brooks.
- I); see also State v. Carlson, 934 P.2d 657, 659 (I Jtah -%,

B.

Whether the trial court erred in submitting a defense of habitation instruction to the
jury which impermissibly shifted the burdens of proof and persuasion to the
defendant.
Standard of Review: "Determining the propriety of a jury instruction presents a

question of law" which is reviewed non-deferentially for correctness. State v. Brooks.
833 P.2d 363, 363 (Utah App. 1992); see also State v. Carlson. 934 P.2d 657, 659 (Utah
App. 1997).
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
Craig Hendricks' objection to Salt Lake City's proposed jury instruction regarding
defense of habitation is preserved in the Record of Appeal at 76:46-48, 144.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-2-405 (1999);
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-36-12 (1999);
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c);
Salt Lake City Code § 11.08.020-DV (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Craig Hendricks was charged with Domestic Violence Battery and Domestic
Violence Disturbing the Peace stemming from an incident on September 9, 2000, wherein
Mr. Hendricks was alleged to have used unlawful force or violence upon his brother,
Lowell Hendricks, and by engaging in fighting behavior. (R. 1-4.) At arraignment, the
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Honorable Judge Anthony B. Quinn appointed the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
(LDA) to represent Mr. Hendricks. (R. 7.) At the pretrial conference, the matter was set
for jury trial on October 11,2000. (R. 13.) On October 11,2000, upon Salt Lake City's
request, the jury trial was continued to October 25, 2000. (R. 18.) The case proceeded to
jury trial where Mr. Hendricks was convicted of Domestic Violence Battery, and
acquitted of the charge of Domestic Violence Disturbing the Peace. (R. 60.)
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
During the late evening of September 9, 2000, Craig Hendricks ("Craig") was
visiting his brother, Lowell Hendricks ("Lowell") at Lowell's residence located at 953
South Denver Street. (R. 76:9-10, 88-90.) Craig had lived with Lowell for several years
and had recently been asked to move. (R. 76:7-8, 67.) All of Craig's belongings were
stored at the Denver Street residence, and his mail was delivered to that address . (R.
76:10, 67-68.) Furthermore, Craig spent the night of September 8,2000, at the Denver
Street home. (R. 76:12,23, 67, 68.) According to testimony elicited at trial, in the early
evening of September 9, 2000, Lowell observed Craig in the backyard of the Denver
Street house working on his truck. (R. 76:9.) Lowell did not ask Craig to leave. (R.
76:9.)
Lowell testified at jury trial that he found Craig inside his house late on September
9, 2000, without his permission. (R. 76:14.) Lowell then told Craig to leave. (R. 76:14.)
Lowell further testified that he never used force or a threat of force to make Craig leave.
3

(R. 76:18-19.) Lowell admitted that he had been drinking alcohol throughout the day of
September 9, 2000. (R. 76:20-21.) Lowell insisted that without warning, Craig attacked
him violently causing a "black eye" and bruising on his arms and legs. (R. 76:14, 16-18.)
Lowell maintained that he did not strike Craig in any way. (R. 76:18-20, 68.)
Craig testified at jury trial that he had stayed the night of September 8, 2000, with
his brother Lowell, and on September 9,2000, Lowell told him he could sleep at the
house again. (R. 76:102.) Craig testified that Lowell was intoxicated and began
touching Craig in an unwanted, teasing manner. (R. 76:90-91.) Craig asked Lowell to
stop. (R. 76:91.) Craig testified that Lowell had become violent in the past, when
Lowell was drunk. (R. 76:90, 93-94.) Craig was afraid that Lowell was going to
become violent yet again that night. (R. 76:93.) At one point in the evening, Lowell
grabbed Craig with unlawful force. (R. 76:93-94.) Craig felt that his only option was to
protect himself; he then punched Lowell in self-defense. (R. 76:93-94.) The two
brothers scuffled for several minutes until Lowell left. (R. 76:93-6.) The police were
called and Craig was subsequently arrested and charged with Domestic Violence Battery
and Domestic Violence Disturbing the Peace. (R. 76:74.)
At jury trial, Salt Lake City Prosecutor Don M. Wrye submitted a proposed
defense of habitation jury instruction to the trial court. (R.76:43.) Defense counsel
objected to the instruction stating that there was no evidence to support the jury
instruction. (R. 76:46-48.) Moreover, defense counsel stated that the instruction would
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confuse the jury and impermissibly negate Craig's self-defense by allowing the jury to
justify Lowell's actions and thereby find that Craig was the initial aggressor. (R. 76:4648, 144.) Counsel for Salt Lake City argued that the defense of habitation instruction
was warranted because Lowell's conduct was justified and to counter the self-defense
claim by the defendant. (R. 76:46.) Judge Boy den then submitted Salt Lake City's
proposed defense of habitation instruction to the jury. (R. 41.)
During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that Lowell was allowed to use
force against Craig because "[ajnything that... Lowell might have done then to try to
stop him [Craig] from coming into his house is justified." (R. 76:136.) The prosecutor
also relied on the presumption that Lowell acted reasonably thereby negating Craig's
self-defense claim as a matter of law. (R. 76:136-37.) The jury returned a verdict of
guilty to Domestic Violence Battery while acquitting Craig of the Domestic Violence
Disturbing the Peace charge. (R. 60.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Craig's right to a fair trial was jeopardized when the trial court submitted a defense
of habitation to the jury, thereby allowing justification of the victim's conduct. Because
the instruction was not supported by the evidence and unconstitutionally shifted both the
burden of proof and persuasion upon the defendant in a criminal case, Craig's conviction
should be reversed and this case remanded for a new trial.

5

ARGUMENT
I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CHARGING THE JURY WITH THE
DEFENSE OF HABITATION INSTRUCTION WHEN THE
INSTRUCTION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
The trial court erred in its conclusion that the prosecution was entitled to present a

defense of habitation instruction to the jury, absent evidence to support such an
instruction. All instructions given to a jury by the trial court must be supported by the
evidence. See, e.g., State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 264 (Utah 1988); State v.
McCardelL 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982). There must exist a relationship between the
given jury instruction and the evidence presented at trial. IdL
Here, the record does not support the trial court's decision to instruct the jury as to
defense of habitation. The defense of habitation instruction submitted at trial is a
paraphrase of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405, which provides a statutory defense to criminal
and civil charges. (R. 41.)(Attached hereto as Addendum B.); see Utah Code Ann. § 762-405. In State ex rel. R.J.Z.. the Utah Supreme Court outlined two criteria a defendant
must meet in order to justify the presentation of the defense of habitation defense. 736
P.2d 235, 236 (Utah 1987)(entry must be unlawful and forceful). First, a defendant must
demonstrate the unlawfulness of an alleged entry, and second, a defendant must
demonstrate the entry was forcible. Id. at 236. At bar, the prosecution failed to
demonstrate sufficient evidence that Craig committed an unlawful and forcible entry into
the house rented by Lowell. Without such a showing, the proposed instruction was
6

improper and should have never been tendered to the jury.
A.

Lowell did not have a legal right to exclude Craig by force
from the Denver Street residence and thus Craig's entry was
not unlawful.

According to Lowell, Craig lived with him for several years. (R. 76:7-8, 67.) All
of Craig's belongings were stored at the Denver Street house and Craig received his mail
at the Denver Street house. (R. 76:10, 67-68.) Moreover, Craig spent the night at the
Denver Street home, as recently as the night before the altercation at issue. (R. 76:12,23,
67-68.) On September 9,2000, Craig even worked on his truck in the backyard of the
Denver Street house and was never asked to leave the premises. (R. 76:9.) Given
Lowell's clear acquiescence, the prosecution failed to prove that Lowell had a legal right
to eject Craigfromthe Denver Street residence.
Utah law does not allow a landlord to use force to evict tenants. See. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-36-12 (exclusion of tenant without the judicial process prohibited). Under
Utah law, even one with a legal right to dispose of and occupy property is not entitled to
use self-help to accomplish that end. Id. Similarly, even assuming, arguendo, that
Lowell may have had a legal right to exclude Craigfromthe Denver Street residence
through the judicial process, he had no right to use force to accomplish that goal.
Other jurisdictions have held that a party may not avail themselves of a defense of
habitation claim when a confrontation arises between cohabitants. In Cooper v. U.S..
cohabitating brothers quarreled, leading to one brother's death. 512 A.2d 1002 (D.C.
7

1986). On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct
the jury that the defendant had a right to defend his home. Instead, the trial judge
instructed the jury on self-defense. The appellate court affirmed the conviction holding
that the defense of habitation defense was inapplicable when both parties have a right to
occupy the house. See also. State v. Bobbit 415 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1982), on remand on
other grounds to. 420 So. 2d 362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1982), petition for review
denied, 429 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1983)(defense of habitation claim is inapplicable unless the
assailant is an intruder).
Here, the need to defend one's homefroman intruder is distinguishable from the
need to defend it from a cohabitating sibling. Because both Craig and Lowell were on
common ground, neither had the legal right to eject the other through force.
B.

Craig's entry into the Denver Street residence was not forcible.

Absolutely no evidence was presented at trial to support the claim that Craig's
entry into the Denver Street house was forcible. At trial, Lowell testified that Craig
entered the house through the unlocked kitchen door. (R. 76:11, 14.) In conflict, Craig
testified that he entered the house through the front door after Lowell let him in, wherein
they had a peaceful conversation prior to the altercation. (R. 76:89-90.) Accepting either
version as true, neither supports a conclusion that Craig's entry into the home was
forcible. Accordingly, the defense of habitation was inapplicable to justify Lowell's
conduct because the prosecution failed to prove that Craig's entry was forcible.
8

C.

The defense of habitation instruction is inapplicable to justify
Lowell's conduct insofar as he is not the defendant.

The prosecution presented the defense of habitation instruction to justify Lowell's
conduct despite the fact that Lowell was not charged with a crime related to this incident.
(R. 76:46.) The defense of habitation instruction did not apply to justify Lowell's
conduct insofar as he was not charged with a criminal offense arising out of this incident
and the defense is a statutory defense to criminal charges. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2405. Had Lowell been the defendant in this case, he would have had the burden of
presenting some evidence in support of his defense of habitation.
There is no evidence that Craig used force to enter Lowell's house. Moreover, the
record is silent as to whether Lowell reasonably believed force was necessary to prevent
or terminate Craig's entry into the home, as required by law. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2405. Surprisingly, the prosecution's own witness, Lowell, maintained that he never used
any force whatsoever against Craig. (R. 76:14, 18-20, 68.) This testimony contradicted
the prosecution's theory that Lowell used force to defend his residence. Because Lowell
maintained that he did not use any force against Craig, the prosecution cannot then claim
that any force used by Lowell was justified in defense of his habitation. Because Lowell
would not be entitled to a defense of habitation instruction had he been the defendant, the
prosecution cannot rely on the defense to justify its victim's actions and thereby negate
Craig's self-defense claim.
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THE DEFENSE OF HABITATION INSTRUCTION IMPERMISSIBLY
SHIFTED THE BURDENS OF PROOF AND PERSUASION UPON THE
DEFENDANT AND DIMINISHED THE PROSECUTION'S BURDEN OF
PROOF
The inclusion of the defense of habitation instruction was misleading, confusing,

and unconstitutionally shifted the burden of both proof and persuasion upon the
defendant. Defense counsel objected to the inclusion of the instruction arguing that it
would confuse the jury and impermissibly negate Craig's self-defense claim.1 (R. 76:4648, 144.) The trial judge disagreed and submitted the jury instruction. (R. 41, R. 76:48.)
The defense of habitation instruction stated:
You are further instructed that a person is justified
in using force against another in defense of one's habitation
when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that
force is necessary to prevent or terminate the other's unlawful
entry into or attack upon that habitation.
Furthermore, the person using force in defense of habitation
is presumed to have acted reasonably and to have had a reasonable
fear of imminent peril of death or serious bodily injury if the
entry or attempted entry is unlawful and is made or attempted
by use of force or in a violent or tumultuous manner.
The reasonableness of a belief that a person is justified
in using force in the defense of habitation is an objective standard
and must be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person
acting under the then existing circumstances. Further, the force

1

Assuming, arguendo, that defense counsel did not preserve the record by stating the
defense of habitation instruction would shift the burdens of proof and persuasion to the
defendant, appellant asserts that the inclusion of the instruction was a manifest injustice. Ut. R.
Crim. P. 19(c); State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352 (Utah App. 1995). Because the instruction had a
presumption that the defendant needed to rebut, the inclusion of the instruction impermissibly
required the defendant to bear the burdens of proof and persuasion against long-standing
precedent to the contrary, and affected the defendant's substantial right to a fair trial.
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used must be proportional. That is, only to the extent necessary
to prevent or terminate what the person using the force
reasonably believes is an unlawful entry into or attack upon, or
attempted unlawful entry into or attack upon, his or her
habitation.
(R. 41.); see Addendum B.
Lackingfromthe defense of habitation instruction was an explanation that the
instruction did not relieve the prosecution of its burden of proof. The instruction also
lacked a definition of what constitutes an unlawful entry. Finally, the instruction failed to
inform the jury that the presumption of reasonableness could be rebutted, or that Craig
was required only to present "some" evidence to rebut the presumption. In essence, the
instruction informed the jury that as a matter of law, a person could use force to remove a
person from a residence, despite law to the contrary. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-12
(exclusion of tenants without the judicial process prohibited); Keller v. Southwood North
Medical Pavilion, 959 P.2d 102 (Utah 1998); Wadev.Jobe. 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991).
At bar, the defense of habitation instruction was prejudicial because it dictated that
the "person using force in defense of habitation is presumed to have acted reasonably..."
(R. 41.); see Addendum B. In effect, the instruction created a mandatory rebuttable
presumption that relieved the prosecution of its burden to prove that Craig did not act in
self-defense.
[I]n criminal cases, the ultimate test of any [evidentiary] device's
constitutional validity in a given case remains constant: the device
must not undermine the factfinder's responsibility at trial, based on
11

evidence adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a
reasonable doubt.
County Court of Ulster County v. Allen. 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979). Here, the jury
instruction at issue relieved the jurors of finding that Craig did not act in self-defense
beyond a reasonable doubt.
A mandatory rebuttable presumption in a jury instruction charged against the
defendant is unconstitutional. See, e.g.. Francis v. Franklin. 471 U.S. 307 (1985); State v.
Chambers. 709 P.2d 321, 326 (Utah 1985). The due process clause requires the
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every fact necessary to
constitute a crime. See. In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Because of constitutional
protections, the prosecution is not entitled to rely on a mandatory rebuttable presumption
that relieves it of its burden of proof and persuasion. Chambers. 709 P.2d at 326.
As laid out in State v. Moritzsky. the defense of habitation defense, pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405, vests in a person who is entitled to assert the defense, the
claim that his actions were reasonable. 771 P.2d 688, 691 (Utah App. 1989). Once a
person is entitled to the presumption of reasonableness, the prosecution is required to
rebut the presumption beyond a reasonable doubt to negate the defense. Id at 691; see
also In re R.J.Z.. 736 P.2d at 236.
Using this framework, the presumption of reasonableness was vested in Lowell's
conduct thereby requiring Craig to rebut the presumption and persuade the jury that
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Lowell's actions were not reasonable. In effect, the defense was not only required to
rebut the presumption, but had the burden of both proof and persuasion as to the Craig's
self-defense claim, which is contrary to long-standing precedent. See, State v. Torres,
619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980) (defendant relying on self-defense is entitled to have the
jury instructed that the State bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and that
the defendant has no burden); State v. Knoll. 712 P.2d 211, 214 (Utah 1985)(the
requirement that State bear burden of proof in self-defense cases derivesfromthe
constitutional requirement that the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt).
Numerous cases have held that a defendant bears no burden of persuasion in presenting
an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Torres, 619 P.2d at 695. The admission of the defense
of habitation instruction thereby violated the defendant's due process rights because not
only did he have to present proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Lowell was not
defending the Denver Street house, but he also had to persuade the jury that Lowell was
not defending the Denver Street house, that Craig's entry wasn't unlawful, and that Craig
was acting in self-defense.
Requiring Craig to prove that he was acting in self-defense flies in the face of
established principles of both federal and state law. See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Montana, 442
U.S. 510, 527 (1979)(ffthe Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees prohibit a state from
shifting to the defendant the burden of disproving an element of the crime charged").
Establishing an affirmative defense is a very limited burden. See State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d
13

775, 779 (Utah App. 1990). The defendant only f,assume[s] the burden of producing
some evidence [of the affirmative defense] if there is no evidence in the prosecution's
case that would provide some kind of evidentiary foundation for [an affirmative defense
claim].11 Knoll, 712 P.2d at 215. Utah has unambiguously adopted the position that "a
defendant does not bear the burden of persuasion in presenting an affirmative defense."
State v. Starks. 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981). "The prosecutors burden ... is to prove all
elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the defense is a denial
or an affirmative defense." IdL The inherent unfairness of requiring Craig to prove that
he was acting in self-defense impermissibly shifted the burden of proof and persuasion
and required him to prove his innocence and deprived him of a fair trial.
In arguing against Craig's self-defense claim, the prosecution relied on the defense
of habitation instruction to justify Lowell's attack on Craig. (R. 76:136-37.) The
prosecutor stated: "[a]nything that... Lowell might have done then to try to stop him
[Craig] from coming into his house is justified." (R. 76:136.) The prosecutor furthered
the problem when he stated that Lowell was presumed to have acted reasonably.
(R.76:136.) In effect, the jury instruction, combined with the prosecutor's argument,
informed the jurors that even if they believed the defendant's account of the incident, they
must find Craig guilty of battery because Lowell was, as a matter of law, allowed to use
unlawful force against Craig and Craig thereby did not have a self-defense claim. The
inclusion of the jury instruction thus compromised Craig's right to present his defense,
14

leaving the jury to presume that Craig was legally unable to raise a claim of self-defense.
Craig's position that the jury instruction confused the jury is supported by the
inconsistent verdict. The jury returned a guilty verdict as to battery, but a not guilty
verdict as to disturbing the peace. (R. 60.) Ironically, the jury determined that Craig had
not engaged in fighting behavior, but yet used unlawful force or violence against Lowell.
A reasonable inference is drawn that the jury may not have clearly understood the given
instruction.
CONCLUSION
Because the defense of habitation instruction was not supported by the evidence,
and was misused by the prosecution to negate the defendant's self-defense claim, it
violated his right to a fair trial. For the reasons stated herein, Mr. Hendricks respectfully
requests that this Court reverse his convictions and remand this case for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this ytt day of June, 2001.

^A£
Rud\J. Biutista
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
450 South State, P.O. Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860
SENTENCE/JUDGMENT FORM
Domestic Violence Court
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ADDENDUM B

INSTRUCTION NO.
You are further instructed that a person is justified in using force
against another in defense one's habitation when and to the extent that
he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to prevent or
terminate the other's unlawful entry into or attack upon that
habitation.
Furthermore, the person using force in defense of habitation is
presumed to have acted reasonably and to have had a reasonable fear
of imminent peril of death or serious bodily injury if the entry or
attempted entry is unlawful and is made or attempted by use of force or
in a violent or tumultuous manner.
The reasonableness of a belief that a person is justified in using
force in the defense of habitation is an objective standard and must be
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person acting under the
then existing circumstances. Further, the force used must be
proportional. That is, only to the extent necessary to prevent or
terminate what the person using the force reasonably believes is an
unlawful entry into or attack upon, or attempted unlawful entry into or
attack upon, his or her habitation.

